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Abstract
Why are U.S. academics, even after tenure and promotion, so timid in their
exercise of academic freedom? Part of the problem is institutional –
academics are subject to a long probationary period under tight collegial
control – but part of the problem is ideological. A hybrid of seventeenth-
century British and nineteenth-century German ideals, U.S. academia – and
the nation more generally – remains ambivalent toward the value of academic
freedom, ultimately inhibiting an unequivocal endorsement.
Is tenure justified? An experimental study of faculty beliefs about tenure,
promotion, and academic freedom Ceci Stephen J. Williams Wendy M.
Mueller-Johnson Katrin Department of Human Development, Cornell
University, Ithaca, NY 14853. sjc9@cornell.edu
http://www.people.cornell.edu/pages/sjc9/; Department of Human
Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853. wmw5@cornell.edu
http://www.human.cornell.edu/che/bio.cfm?netid=wmw5; Faculty of Law,
University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DT, United Kingdom.
kum20@cam.ac.uk
What is perhaps most surprising about Ceci et al.'s study of the relationship
between academic rank and attitudes toward “academic freedom” is not its
findings but the apparently primitive state of empirical research examining
the matter. Moreover, contrary to the authors' suggestion, the United States,
although perhaps the nation most ideologically committed to tenure as a
vehicle for promoting academic freedom, does not have an especially coherent
normative justification for the practice. As in so many other matters, the
United States filters aspects of the British and German experience through its
own distinctive history. The result is a lively mélange of competing notions
that render the concept of academic freedom “essentially contested.”
Ceci et al.'s findings themselves are predictable: Tenured full professors are
more comfortable challenging the words and deeds of their colleagues than
are academics who have yet to complete either the tenure or the promotion
process, with all ranks turning out to be more timidly disposed than any of
them had imagined. Surprisingly, Ceci et al. do not draw the most obvious
conclusion to explain this result; namely, that in American universities, tenure
and promotion are subject to relatively strong collegial oversight for a
relatively long period. The pressure to conform to local norms is thus
unusually strong, especially in the run-up to a tenure decision, and it has
lasting effects on the candidates. (This policy also affects the examination of
doctoral dissertations, the fate of which is almost always determined in-
house.)
From a European standpoint, the United States is striking in the weight
accorded to a candidate's local public relations. The good will of tenured and
promoted members of a candidate's department is essential for success, as
higher levels of academic administration tend to respect the judgments issued
at lower levels, unless circumstances clearly indicate otherwise. The hiring of
even full professors in the United States is treated as primarily a
departmental, rather than a university, appointment. Issues captured by the
phrase “team player” can easily eclipse whatever merits a candidate brings as
an individual. Moreover, a consequence of the relative autonomy enjoyed by
U.S. academic departments is that their members are more preoccupied with
boundary maintenance. Thus, every prospective tenure candidate raises the
spectre of opportunity costs; namely, the other possible candidates one might
hire – and who might be a better fit – if this one is denied tenure.
The solution would seem to be simple: Refer tenure and promotion decisions
to a higher level of the university, and over a shorter period of time, to remove
local prejudice and inhibit the formation of conformist attitudes. For example,
the probationary period for regular academic staff in the United Kingdom has
been traditionally only 3 years, not 6 or 7. The several levels of promotion are
still based on inter-departmental competitions, where the frame of reference
is the overall contribution to the university and the candidate's discipline, not
specifically the well-being of his or her department. To be sure, the United
Kingdom has drifted over the past two decades toward a more U.S.-style
system, but this has happened for reasons unrelated to academic freedom.
On the one hand, longer probationary periods allow more discretion for
administrators to reconstitute academic units to fit changing market
conditions. On the other hand, a stress on departmental cohesion is more
likely to generate a distinctive “research culture,” which is a key indicator in
national academic performance measures.
The large question that looms behind Ceci et al.'s findings is whether
academics are themselves the best guarantors of academic freedom. Given the
self-organizing origins of the American Association of University Professors,
the answer may appear to be obviously yes. However, Germany under the
Second Reich provides an alternative precedent. Academic freedom in this
context was not simply a specialised version of free speech but a guild
privilege of a certain profession not enjoyed by society at large. Corresponding
to such privileges were obligations, not least of which was to publicize one's
research in the classroom and the wider society. Moreover, academics could
legally criticize state policy by invoking the spirit of the “nation” that may have
temporarily eluded the politicians. But could academics be trusted to
administer their own delicate position? The answer was no, as academics were
as self-serving as anyone else. Here the higher-education minister, Friedrich
Althoff, did all he could to control the hiring and promotion of professors,
typically by preventing the formation of local academic dynasties through
nationwide competitions. The “Althoff system,” although irritating the likes of
Max Weber, is largely credited with having propelled Germany to scientific
preeminence in the years leading up to the First World War (Spinner 1993).
The mere reinforcement of local norms was insufficient for academic
advancement: Ambitious academics had to strike out in innovative ways that
appeared to promote the national interest.
America's constitutionally devolved educational authority renders a
homegrown version of Althoff highly unlikely, except perhaps at the level of
state university systems. However, Althoff indirectly throws light on a
fundamental ambivalence about the U.S. commitment to academic freedom.
As Ceci et al. rightly observe, attacks on academic freedom from both the
political right and left have often centred on the anticipated consequences of
taking seriously what academics have said. In the German context, this would
be a problem only if a professor threatened national security or, more
immediately, abrogated students' freedom to learn. (David Horowitz's
campaign to have U.S. universities adopt an “academic bill of rights” taps into
this latter sentiment.) However, the more vague but pervasive American
challenges to academic freedom hark back to the campus-based setting of the
original colleges (modelled on Oxbridge) that anchor so many normative
intuitions about university life in the United States, regardless of institutional
foundation (Fuller 2002, pp. 220–25). These intuitions, epitomized in the
legal expression “in loco parentis,” are most clearly manifested in what is often
praised as the pronounced pastoral side of American university life. But it may
also be that this residual idea of the university as the extended family (i.e.,
“alma mater”) may also encourage an overprotective self-censorship that
ultimately undermines an unequivocal defence or exercise of academic
freedom.
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